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I. INTRODUCTION 
In theory, if not reality, each tribal judiciary attempts to 
conscientiously serve the community that created it. This simple 
proposition likely binds jurists from across the globe regardless of 
race, ethnicity, or nationality. Beyond that similarity, tribal court 
systems differ in structure and substance, sometimes significantly 
and sometimes dramatically. 
     †  Citizen of the Ho-Chunk Nation; Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Solicitor 
General; Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court Chief Justice; University of Minnesota 
Law School Adjunct Professor (Indian Law, 2016–2017). Additionally, the author 
has served in a judicial pro tempore capacity for eight tribes in Michigan and 
Wisconsin. The author does not profess a unique personal knowledge of tribal 
tradition and custom but has consistently attempted to infuse this essential law into 
judicial opinions entered over the course of nearly eighteen years on the bench. 
The viewpoints expressed herein represent the individual perspective of the author 
and not the official position of any of the author’s employers. As an affirmation of 
tribal sovereignty, the author uses each tribal court’s citation method when citing 
to each sovereign’s statutes and court opinions. 
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A tribal judiciary may emerge through tribal legislation or,1 at 
times, trace its origin to a constitutional source.2 In either instance, 
a tribal court functions pursuant to law, written and unwritten.3 This 
unique body of law, along with corresponding procedures,4 
produces clear distinctions between tribal judiciaries. In fact, the 
jurisprudential distinctions that arise may appear more pronounced 
than those that exist within and between the federal and state 
systems. Some commonalities emerge,5 but similarities are easily 
overstated. 
1. See, e.g., 5 MLBSA §§ 1–2 (2011) (identifying the legislative formation of
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Court of Central Jurisdiction in 1981, comprising 
separate trial and appellate level tribunals that derive authority from the Band 
Assembly, a successor to the monocratic Reservation Business Committee). The 
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe is a federally recognized Indian tribe and constitutes one 
of six distinct sovereign bands that compose the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. Indian 
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5021 (Jan. 29, 2016). The acronym “MLBSA” 
refers to Mille Lacs Band Statutes Annotated, which are accessible in current form 
on the Band’s website at http://millelacsband.com/tribal-government-home 
/band-statutesordinances/. 
2. See, e.g., HCN CONST. art. III, § 2, http://www.ho-chunknation.com
/government/the-constitution-of-the-ho-chunk-nation.aspx (establishing a four-
part governmental structure in 1994, including the Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary, 
which technically formed in 1995 and comprises separate trial and appellate level 
tribunals and a Traditional Court that consists of recognized hocąk clan and Native 
American Church leaders). The Ho-Chunk Nation is a federally recognized Indian 
tribe formerly known as the Wisconsin Winnebago. Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 5021. 
3. See HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies, both criminal and civil, in law or in 
equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and traditions of the Ho-
Chunk Nation . . . .”); 5 MLBSA § 111(c) (2011) (demarcating the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court of Central Jurisdiction, which extends to “any cause of 
action that may arise from unwritten cultural law or a violation thereof”). 
4. See HCN CONST. art. VII, § 7(b) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power
to establish written rules for the Judiciary . . . .”); 5 MLBSA § 105(a) (2011) (“The 
Court of Central Jurisdiction shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the 
forms of process, writs, pleadings, rules of evidence and motions and the practice 
and procedure of the District Court and Court of Appeals . . . .”). 
5. A tribal judiciary, for example, must afford litigants the protections
afforded by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
824, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77–78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)–(d) 
(2012))) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act . . . extends to ‘any person’ within the tribe’s 
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the Federal 
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Consequently, one cannot examine a few, to even several, tribal 
court systems and offer a meaningful critique of tribal judiciaries in 
general.6 Extrapolation of common and consistent doctrines, 
principles, and theories within a single tribal system oftentimes 
proves difficult due to largely unpublished or fairly inaccessible case 
law.7 For this reason or others, most commentators do not typically 
dedicate attention to a single tribal judiciary. Perhaps such emphasis 
would not generate a sufficient audience, but an expanded survey 
risks losing genuine insight and usually affords only some 
rudimentary conclusions.8 
That being said, every tribal court encounters core issues when 
performing a judicial function. Each pursues an evolutionary arc, 
whether intentional or not, during its institutional development. As 
an initial matter, tribal courts primarily confront and resolve cases 
Constitution.”); see also HCN CONST. art. X, § 1(a); 1 MLBSA §§ 1–11 (2010). 
6. While not intended as a critical examination or comparative analysis of two
tribal judiciaries, the focus of this article will remain on the Mille Lacs Band of 
Ojibwe and the Ho-Chunk Nation in order to elicit and endorse certain 
fundamental premises. 
7. The Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary posts the full text of all substantive
appellate opinions entered in its twenty-one-year history on its website at 
http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judiciary/supreme-court-opinions 
.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). In contrast, the Mille Lacs Band Court of Central 
Jurisdiction offers single paragraph descriptions of ten appellate decisions issued 
since 1981. See Precedent Case Laws, MILLE LACS BAND OF OJIBWE, 
http://millelacsband.com/tribal-government-home/tribal-courts/precedent-case  
-laws/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). Otherwise, each court system provides open access 
to its trial and appellate level case law, but the prospect of conducting timely and 
meaningful research is challenging. See 1 HCC § 1.5b (2015) (“The Judiciary shall 
complete a permanent record of all proceedings and decisions . . . . Absent 
protective orders granted for good cause or Legislative enactments to the contrary, 
these records shall be open to the public.”); 24 MLBSA §§ 2010–2011 (2012) 
(requiring that “proceedings of the Court of Central Jurisdiction shall be open to 
the public except in matters involving minors” and obliging the Court to “maintain 
a record of all proceedings . . . , which shall include . . . the judgment”). The 
acronym “HCC” refers to Ho-Chunk Code, which is accessible in current form on 
the Tribe’s website at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/Ho-ChunkNationLaws 
.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
8. The sheer number of tribal courts poses an issue to large surveys due to the
potential for a huge amount of variation among them. Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 59, 73 n.79 (2013) (speculating that the number of tribal judicial 
systems totals approximately 250 to 300). 
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arising squarely under tribal,9 rather than federal,10 law. More 
commonly, a tribal judiciary will tangentially address federal Indian 
law issues in cases that derive from or coincide with state proceedings 
subject to overarching federal prerogatives.11  
In this article, the author provides a candid glimpse into the 
development of a tribal jurisprudential philosophy, drawing upon 
his unique experience as a tribal jurist and in-house legal counsel. 
The article examines the difficulty inherent in shaping and 
sustaining a tribal judiciary necessarily moored in tradition and 
custom yet integrating characteristics essential to all courts of 
competent jurisdiction. Part II briefly examines the doctrine of 
subject matter jurisdiction, which, at its core, must serve as a 
requisite to the exercise of judicial power. However, this 
fundamental, extrinsic doctrine—as well as others—has 
unfortunately become an amalgam of constitutional constraints and 
prudential considerations. The resulting confusion that permeates 
federal and state case law can easily confound a fledgling tribal 
judiciary’s attempt to resort to such persuasive authority even when 
seemingly called for by underlying tribal constitutional or statutory 
law. Moreover, the incorporation of or reliance upon external 
judicial analyses proves more problematic in a tribal setting since the 
respective courts must balance competing concerns largely absent 
within judicial systems of federal and state counterparts. 
Part III focuses on the intersection between tribal tradition and 
custom in western jurisprudence. The degree of significance due to 
either common law tradition must vary depending upon the 
circumstances. The author highlights two tribal cases to illustrate the 
hazards of unwisely gravitating toward one tradition and seemingly 
9. See, e.g., HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies, both criminal and civil, in law or in 
equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and traditions of the Ho-
Chunk Nation.”). 
10. In over twelve years on the Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court bench, the author
presided over fewer than five cases that one would regard as raising substantial 
federal Indian law issues. Similarly, in over five years as chief in-house counsel for 
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, the author’s office has not defended a single matter 
in the Court of Central Jurisdiction that one would immediately conceive of as a 
federal Indian law case. 
11. For example, tribal courts routinely consider and accept child protection
cases involving Indian children that first arise within the state system. See generally 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 93 Stat. 3071 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)). 
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excluding the other. Tribal courts must instead cautiously traverse 
the legal landscape, embracing and revitalizing sources of 
indigenous law while carefully assimilating foreign law to 
complement the emergence of a decidedly tribal jurisprudence. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND
RELATED INQUIRIES 
When traversing more familiar ground, a tribal court, as any 
court, must preliminarily deduce whether it may exercise subject 
matter jurisdiction over a dispute.12 The inquiry should remain 
elemental, as commonly required by tribal law,13 and, therefore, may 
correspond with federal and state practice. However, a tribal 
judiciary must carefully scrutinize the development of external case 
law in order to avoid the unwarranted incorporation of matters 
beyond the scope of simply determining the presence of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
12. If a case presents federal Indian law concerns, the jurisdictional inquiry
takes on a further dimension. In a civil matter sounding in contract, for instance, a 
tribal court must remain ever mindful of the extent of its tribal adjudicatory 
jurisdiction as acknowledged within federal common law. See Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations . . . . 
A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe . . . through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.” (emphasis added)). In a subsequent case the Court held that 
a “tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction” could not surpass the permissible extent of tribal 
regulatory jurisdiction. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). The 
Court, in dicta, later equated adjudicatory jurisdiction with subject matter 
jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 n.8 (2001). But “[t]he Court’s 
‘consensual relationship’ analysis under Montana resembles the Court’s Due Process 
Clause analysis for purposes of personal jurisdiction.” Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 
434 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, the federal inquiry incorporates 
elements traditionally associated with both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1137. The above-stated first Montana exception erects the metes and bounds 
of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction in a contractual matter, but a secondary 
examination must occur to determine whether specific non-member conduct falls 
within those common law parameters. See Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs. 
Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 934–38 (8th Cir. 2010). 
The intersection of these two inquiries reveals a matter over which a tribal court 
may exercise its reserved inherent authority. 
13. E.g., HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (“The Trial Court shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases . . . arising under the Constitution, laws, customs, and 
traditions of the Ho-Chunk Nation.”). 
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To begin, no court can act outside the bounds of its established 
subject matter jurisdiction.14 Essentially, a court may exercise subject 
matter jurisdiction over a cause of action if constitutionally or 
statutorily empowered to hear such cases in the abstract.15 
“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter, is power to adjudge concerning 
the general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state 
of facts which may appear in a particular case, arising, or which is 
claimed to have arisen, under that general question.”16 
While tribal litigants can, and often do, raise subject matter 
jurisdiction as an affirmative defense,17 a failure to do so should not 
constitute a waiver.18 In this respect, subject matter jurisdiction 
markedly differs from its corollary—personal jurisdiction. “The 
concepts of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction . . . serve 
14. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (reversing and
remanding with instructions that the case should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction). 
15. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
16. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229 (1878); see also Mills v. Commonwealth, 13
Pa. 627, 630 (1850) (“Jurisdiction in courts is the power and authority to declare 
the law. The very word, in its origin, imports as much; it is derived from juris and 
dico; I speak by the law.”). Generally speaking, earlier judicial decisions capably 
addressed core principles, such as subject matter jurisdiction, in unambiguous, 
elemental terms: 
[Subject matter jurisdiction] is the right of the court to exercise judicial 
power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather 
the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one 
pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause 
of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in 
which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may 
be developed during the trial. 
Richardson v. Ruddy, 98 P. 842, 844 (Idaho 1908) (quoting TIMOTHY BROWN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS § 1a (1891)). 
17. See, e.g., HCN R. CIV. P. 6(A), http://www.ho-chunknation.com
/government/judiciary/judicial-rules.aspx (“The Answer shall . . . state any defenses 
to the Complaint.”). 
18. This jurisdictional underpinning must continue to exist at every stage of
the litigation, including throughout an appeal. See, e.g., Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 
1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[I]t has been the virtually universally accepted practice 
of the federal courts to permit any party to challenge or, indeed, to raise sua sponte 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time and at any stage of the 
proceedings.”). A court should independently monitor whether subject matter 
jurisdiction persists since a judicial act taken in its absence is presumptively null and 
void. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
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different purposes, and these different purposes affect the legal 
character of the two requirements.”19 More precisely, “the personal 
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual 
liberty interest,” and “[b]ecause the requirement . . . represents first 
of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”20 
Although other rights, functioning as affirmative defenses, are 
subject to waiver, courts have confusingly expressed or held that 
successful movants have deprived the respective courts of 
“jurisdiction,” in general terms.21 This characterization has 
regrettably led to courts conflating subject matter jurisdiction with 
immunity,22 justiciability,23 and timing defenses,24 to name a few. 
19. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982). 
20. Id. at 702–03.
21. In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court carefully avoided this morass
but chastised the appellants for their carelessness: “Petitioners fail to recognize the 
distinction between the two concepts—speaking instead in general terms of 
‘jurisdiction’—although their argument’s strength comes from conceiving of 
jurisdiction only as subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 701. 
22. See, e.g., E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Indian High Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302–03
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Tribal sovereign immunity is a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction, which may be challenged by a motion to dismiss.” (citations omitted)). 
But see, e.g., In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“[S]overeign immunity is a jurisdictional consideration separate from subject 
matter jurisdiction . . . .”); see also United States v. Cty. of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 
389 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hat sovereign immunity means is that relief against the 
[sovereign] depends on a statute; the question is not the competence of the court 
to render a binding judgment, but the propriety of interpreting a given statute to 
allow particular relief.”). 
23. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 30. But see, e.g., Md. Waste Coal., Inc.
v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 581 A.2d 60, 61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (“Standing is
concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit. Subject matter 
jurisdiction is concerned with whether the court has the power to hear a case.”). 
24. See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886 (Tenn. 1993) (“[S]ome state
courts hold that the expiration of the statute of limitations is jurisdictional and need 
not be raised in a pre-trial motion.”). But see, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 
390, 397 (1944) (Fowler, J., dissenting) (“In every case wherein the statement has 
been made that the running of the statute [of limitation] extinguished a right it 
extinguished it because and merely because the one in whose favor the statute has 
run asserted his [or her] right to interpose the statute as a defense.”). See generally 
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (comparing the timely filing 
of an EEOC discrimination complaint with the statute of limitations and reasoning 
that neither are prerequisites to jurisdiction, but both are subject to waiver, 
estoppel, and equitable tolling). 
7
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The United States Supreme Court, at times, has also 
engendered or compounded the confusion. By 1998, in Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court lamented that jurisdiction 
“is a word of many, too many, meanings.”25 Therefore, it sought to 
restore primacy to the core concepts underlying subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
[As] . . . reflected in a long and venerable line of our 
cases[:] “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at 
all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, 
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to 
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the 
cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868).[26] “On 
every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental 
question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then 
of the court from which the record comes. This question 
the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when 
not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the 
relation of the parties to it.” Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel 
Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900).[27] The requirement 
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 
“spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power” 
. . . and is “inflexible and without exception.” Mansfield, C. 
& L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).28 
25. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
26. The McCardle Court confronted an instance where Congress repealed the
provision upon which the plaintiff based the cause of action. Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“[W]hen an act of the legislature is repealed, it must be 
considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it never existed.”). As 
such, the case purportedly involved a federal question inquiry, which equates with 
the Ho-Chunk Nation’s preliminary examination under article VII, section 5(a). See 
supra note 13. 
27. The Jones Court encountered a question of diversity jurisdiction for which
tribal courts have no analogue. This second category of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction can converge with an examination of personal jurisdiction, but the two 
doctrines are not coterminous. 
28. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. at 94–95. But cf. Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (allowing a court to first address 
abstention concerns since a venue examination does not involve an assessment of 
the merits); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1999) 
(permitting a precedential review of personal jurisdiction, especially when 
considerably less onerous than a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry). 
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Then, following a forceful admonition,29 the Court diverted 
from the cited authority and incorporated the standing inquiry—a 
component of the doctrine of justiciability—into the Court’s 
examination of jurisdiction. In particular, “[the] triad of injury in 
fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of [the] case-
or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking . . . jurisdiction 
bears the burden of establishing its existence.”30 So, regardless of its 
motivation, the United States Supreme Court has not retained the 
purity of analysis once expected of an examination of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court has sanctioned the preliminary, 
albeit limited, consideration of defenses arguably unconnected to 
subject matter jurisdiction.31 
III. ROLE OF TRIBAL TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS AND FOREIGN LAW
IN TRIBAL COURT DECISIONS 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens for a Better Environment 
decision should caution tribal court systems against indiscriminately 
relying upon or incorporating external case law even when seeking 
guidance on seemingly fundamental doctrines. Yet, despite 
prudential and other considerations sometimes corrupting 
supposedly incorruptible concepts, a tribal judiciary should not 
simply disregard federal precedential authority developed over 
centuries. This becomes even more important when tribal 
constitutional drafters, legislators, and voters either choose or 
sanction the inclusion of foreign concepts within the written law. A 
tribal court would be unwise to ignore common law that has 
furnished meaning to phrases such as “subject matter jurisdiction,”32 
“personal jurisdiction,”33 “cases and controversies,”34 “cause of 
29. “For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or constitutionality of a . . .
law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra 
vires.” Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. at 101–02. 
30. Id. at 103–04.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. 2 HCC §§ 15.3d, 4a (2005); 5 MLBSA § 111 (2011).
33. 2 HCC §§ 15.4b, 5 (2005); 5 MLBSA § 113 (2011).
34. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 5(a).
9
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action,”35 “law and equity,”36 and “injunctive and declaratory 
relief.”37 
Tribal court judges and justices must observe a principal duty to 
interpret the law.38 In doing so, a judge or justice should not 
presumptively graft tribal tradition and custom with a foreign 
concept to create a more palatable alternative.39 At times, such a 
practice could yield unanticipated or nonsensical results.40 Also, the 
integration of customary and statutory law better befits the legislative 
process, which would enable adequate consultation, deliberation, 
and reflection.41 
Still, a tribal judiciary cannot forsake its constitutional or 
statutory responsibility to adjudicate matters arising under tradition 
35. 2 HCC § 14.3 (2005); 5 MLBSA § 111(b)–(c) (2011); 24 MLBSA § 2005
(2012). 
36. HCN CONST. art. VII, §§ 5(a), 6(a); 5 MLBSA § 101 (2011).
37. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 6(a); 5 MLBSA § 111(d)(2) (2011).
38. HCN CONST. art. VII, § 4; 5 MLBSA § 104 (2011).
39. In this regard, the Mille Lacs Band Assembly has prohibited the Court of
Central Jurisdiction from the use of state law that conflicts with tribal tradition and 
custom. See 24 MLBSA § 2007(a) (2012). 
40. See, e.g., Topping v. HCN Grievance Review Bd., SU 09-08 (HCN S. Ct., July
1, 2010) at 10–14 (requiring observance of the traditional principle of woįgixate, i.e., 
treating everyone with respect and compassion, in conjunction with the provision 
of due process and concluding that the tribal employer must “be sure that no 
further accommodations were possible” before terminating an individual with a 
health condition). A subsequent inability to agree upon and adhere to the Court’s 
seemingly stringent standard necessitated three appeals before finalizing the 
discharge from employment initiated over six years earlier. Topping v. Martin, SU 
14-03 (HCN S. Ct., Jan. 16, 2015). 
41. If a tribal judiciary possesses rulemaking authority, it should responsibly
endeavor to incorporate tradition and custom within its governing rules to the 
extent possible. Cf. supra note 4 and accompanying text. The Ho-Chunk Nation 
Supreme Court has engaged in an extended and ongoing consultation with the 
Traditional Court to integrate traditional principles into proposed criminal rules. 
Fellow Justices Samantha C. Skenandore and Tricia A. Zunker have principally and 
ably undertaken this responsibility. One intriguing suggested component to the 
rules would effectively enable an ever-evolving common law. The Supreme Court 
envisions an individual who is a clan leader and Traditional Court member 
accompanying tribal member criminal defendants to scheduled hearings. The 
Traditional Court member could inform the Trial Court judges of the presence of 
tradition and custom germane to a proceeding, if not comprehensively reflected in 
the law or corresponding rule. In addition, the Traditional Court member could 
serve as an invaluable resource in restoring harmony amongst the parties and within 
the community. As an aside, each jurist in the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme and Trial 
Courts is a licensed attorney and enrolled Ho-Chunk tribal member. 
10
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and custom.42 Defendants may express some wariness over pleadings 
based on unwritten law, but, typically, articulations of tradition and 
custom are neither surprising nor controversial.43 Rather, the tribal 
common law memorialized in judicial opinion represents the 
preservation of social mores and values for an enduring 
community.44 
On occasion, tradition and custom may complement or explain 
tribal statute or rule.45 Customary defenses may also become 
42. E.g., Gardner v. Littlejohn, CV 10-47 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 2, 2011)
(acknowledging the traditional offense of defamation), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
SU 11-02 (HCN S. Ct., Oct. 5, 2011); In re Name Change of White, CV 06-44 (HCN 
Tr. Ct., Aug. 21, 2006) (permitting name change petition based upon traditional 
prominence of paternal lineage); Decorah v. Whitegull, CV 02-17 (HCN Tr. Ct., 
Mar. 1, 2002) (recognizing traditional authority of family matriarch to condition 
entry to household, thereby giving rise to a trespass action); Ho-Chunk Nation v. 
Olsen, CV 99-81 (HCN Tr. Ct., Sept. 18, 2000) (identifying customary contract 
principles); Whiteagle-Fintak v. Fintak, DV 99-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., Sept. 8, 1999) 
(identifying traditional abhorrence of domestic abuse); Mike v. Mike, CV 99-31 
(HCN Tr. Ct., July 23, 1999) (identifying traditional abhorrence of elder abuse); cf. 
HCN Hous. Auth. v. Cont’l Flooring Co., CV 01-76 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 19, 2002) 
(refusing tribal invitation to elevate traditional contract principles over existing 
written agreement between the parties); Arnett v. HCN Dep’t of Admin., CV 00-60, 
65 (HCN Tr. Ct., Jan. 8, 2001) (confirming the absence of a traditional concept of 
promissory estoppel), appeal denied, SU 01-01 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 01, 2001). The two 
earliest cases cited above precipitated the passage of corresponding statutes: Mike v. 
Mike precipitated the passage of the Elder Protection Act of 2001, 4 HCC § 1, and 
Whiteagle-Fintak v. Fintak triggered the adoption of the Domestic Abuse Act of 2000, 
4 HCC § 5. 
43. The preceding six Ho-Chunk cases constitute the only instances since 1995
in which tradition and custom served as an independent basis for the exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction. An exact number of Mille Lacs Band cases remains 
unknown due to reasons cited above, supra note 7 and accompanying text, but is 
likely comparable or fewer since plaintiffs may identify federal and state law causes 
of action if no relevant Band statute exists. See 24 MLBSA § 2007(a) (2012). That 
aside, Ojibwe tradition and custom are expected to guide every judicial proceeding. 
The traditional concept of sha WA ni ma must inform the adjudication of all matters. 
In particular, “the laws of the Band shall be construed to balance the rights of the 
individual with the need to continue to co-exist in peace and harmony with one 
another. In this way, order will be preserved and justice shall be accorded to each 
person.” 24 MLBSA § 2003. 
44. In a similar manner, within the English courts of law, “traditions and
customs . . . formed the substance of the common law.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 735 (1999). 
45. See, e.g., Garcia v. Greendeer-Lee, SU 03-01 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 30, 2003)
(Hunter, C.J., concurring) (explaining foundation of Wąkšik Wošgą traditional leave 
policy appearing in the former Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual); In the 
11
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available in certain contexts.46 However, tradition and custom does 
not usually pervade tribal case law for various reasons, including, but 
not limited to, (1) inconsonant constitutional or statutory law, (2) 
unknowledgeable or uncertain jurists and litigants, (3) inadequate 
expert referral systems, and (4) unfortunate loss of tribal heritage 
and language.47 
Interest of the Minor Child: K.E.F., SU 97-03 (HCN S. Ct., Oct. 17, 1997) 
(comparing the customary opportunity to be heard with analogous due process 
requirement); Dobbs v. Stacy, CS 07-57 (HCN Tr. Ct., June 18, 2009) (regarding 
role of traditional spokesperson as referenced in the Rules for Admission to 
Practice); White Eagle v. Ho-Chunk Casino, CV 04-97 (HCN Tr. Ct., July 14, 2005) 
(construing the Employment Relation Act’s Unpaid Leave of Absence policy to 
require leave approval when undertaking a traditional duty of care for one’s ailing 
father-in-law); In the Interest of C.A.D., CV 98-38 (HCN Tr. Ct., Apr. 15, 2002) 
(detailing familial and clan customary responsibility for incompetent members 
when interpreting provisions in the former Hocąk Nation Children and Family 
Code). 
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Webster, SU 06-03 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 9, 2007)
(establishing that an individual could not traditionally pursue personal interest to 
the detriment of the tribe); Gardner, CV 10-47 (recognizing warrior’s privilege, 
which affords absolute immunity to combat veterans in relation to public 
statements); In re Effected Elder, DV 09-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., July 9, 2009) (verifying 
the customary existence of grandparent visitation rights); Mudd v. HCN Legislature, 
CV 03-01 (HCN Tr. Ct., Feb. 13, 2003) (conferring standing upon combat veterans 
and family patriarch to assert interests of the tribe and female relatives, 
respectively), rev’d on other grounds, SU 03-02 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 8, 2003). 
47. The foregoing reasons may jointly contribute to a dearth of tribal
jurisprudence with specific reference to tradition and custom. The Ho-Chunk 
Nation Judiciary is truly fortunate to include the Traditional Court, and while the 
judges, justices, and litigants may freely confer with this revered tribunal, the 
referenced cases herein represent the entire canon of traditional jurisprudence. See 
HCN R. CIV. P. 8(B) (“Upon a motion of the Court or by the party, the Trial Court 
may request assistance from the Traditional Court on matters relating to custom 
and tradition of the Nation . . . .”). The cited case law does not contain those matters 
independently resolved by the Traditional Court, where a formal written decision is 
not issued. HCN R. CIV. P. 8(A) (“[A] party may request to appear before the 
Traditional Court on matters related to tradition and custom . . . , [and] must 
voluntarily consent . . . to be bound by its decision.”). A single instance, however, 
exists where the Traditional Court accepted transfer of a case initiated in the Trial 
Court, because the proceeding involved a unique matter sounding entirely in 
tradition and custom. A Ho-Chunk veteran had passed away, and an unknowing 
funeral director conferred the United States flag for burial upon a surviving sister. 
Subsequently, the deceased’s adult son, also a veteran, demanded possession of the 
flag. The Traditional Court undertook to resolve the matter, which proved to be of 
fundamental importance within the Ho-Chunk warrior society. In accordance with 
procedural rule, the Trial Court issued an abridged judgment, omitting any 
12
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Yet, even if tradition and custom do not appear on the face of a 
judgment, they likely aided in reaching the judgment. Litigants 
almost always encounter an atmosphere in tribal court that proves 
more conducive than state and federal courts to fostering 
compassion and understanding, if not unanimity.48 A tribal court will 
generally afford a party significant latitude to express his or her 
position, even if for cathartic effect alone. That being said, a tribal 
judge or justice should not dispense with procedural and substantive 
requisites under the guise of such laudable purposes. An ostensible 
observation of tradition and custom must not become shorthand for 
judicial laziness. 
Quite simply, the task of a tribal judge or justice is a daunting 
one. Most tribal judiciaries do not claim a lengthy pedigree, and, as 
expected, tribal jurists must resolve many issues of first impression. 
These jurists must typically attempt to dispense justice within close 
proximity of political influence given the relatively small population 
of tribes.49 Furthermore, tribal court systems must operate with 
diminished resources, financial and otherwise, and perhaps a 
compromised ability to research tribal case precedent. Even further, 
many tribal courts rely on lay judges, who oftentimes perform an 
admirable job but must tackle the issues identified in this article, 
among others, with sometimes little internal assistance or external 
support. 
Against this backdrop, a tribal judiciary must contend with the 
inherent tension that comes from sustaining tradition and custom 
reference to particular tradition and custom. Percy v. Swan, CV 96-28 (HCN Tr. Ct., 
Apr. 2, 1998); see also HCN R. CIV. P. 70 (“All decisions of the Traditional Court will 
be summarized in writing by the Trial Court Judge.”). Given a history of exploitive 
interaction with cultural anthropologists, the Traditional Court has remained 
reluctant to divulge tradition and custom that pertains to interpersonal and clan-
related duties. 
48. See 24 MLBSA § 2002 (“The judicial philosophy of the Non-Removable
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians is a product of . . . our customs of life since 
time immemorial . . . . [P]roceedings in the Court of Central Jurisdiction shall not 
be adversarial but shall be a search for truth and justice.”); HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 4-
1(C) (2015), http://www.ho-chunknation.com/media/35131/hcn_r__judicial 
_ethics__12-4-15_.pdf (“A tribal court judge or justice should give to every person 
who is legally interested in a proceeding . . . a full right to be heard according to 
tribal law and tradition.”). 
49. For example, the Ho-Chunk Nation declared an August 1, 2016,
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while incorporating external jurisprudential principles when 
appropriate. A tribal court will unnecessarily struggle if it selects to 
adopt a single methodology when a syncretic approach should 
predominate. Tribal courts should eschew a wholesale adoption of 
foreign case law seemingly done for purposes of expediency.50 
Similarly, tribal courts must exercise care when interpreting 
established legal doctrine through the lens of tradition and custom. 
The two case summaries below illustrate the pitfalls associated with 
either practice. 
Each appellate court encountered issues of first impression and, 
more than likely, internally grappled with determining the most 
fitting approach to the respective controversies. Both factual 
scenarios required the courts to address a single tribal member’s 
alleged betrayal or disruption of tribal societal norms. Each tribal 
member resorted to the Indian Civil Rights Act,51 and corresponding 
tribal law, in defense of their actions. The similarities then fall away, 
demonstrating, yet again, the inherent difficulty of offering 
generalizations in an academic discussion of tribal courts. 
In the first case, the elected leadership of the Ho-Chunk Nation 
sought to transform a bingo facility in Madison, Wisconsin, into a 
full-fledged casino, which the tribe had reserved as a possibility 
within its 1992 gaming compact with the state.52 The City of Madison 
set the matter for a nonbinding referendum scheduled for February 
17, 2004, but former Governor James E. Doyle indicated he would 
accept the results as dispositive. In the midst of the referendum 
campaign, Ho-Chunk tribal member and supervisory gaming 
employee Daniel M. Brown, acting in his individual capacity, 
provided interviews after business hours to the local media, 
remarking that the Ho-Chunk Nation promoted discriminatory 
50. At this juncture, most tribal jurists join established judicial systems and have
not had an opportunity to participate in the formation of a given judiciary. Multiple 
reasons counsel against tribes perfunctorily adopting the judicial model of the 
oppressor, but valid arguments also exist for creating parallel or analogous 
governmental structures. These important issues remain outside the purview of this 
article. 
51. “Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) makes a handful of
analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts . . . ‘the guarantees are not 
identical’ [to the Bill of Rights] . . . .” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384–85 (2001) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). But see supra note 5 and accompanying 
text. 
52. Brown v. Webster, SU 06-03 (HCN S. Ct., Feb. 9, 2007).
14
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employment practices.53 Whether these interviews impacted the 
referendum remains unknown, but Madison residents rejected the 
casino proposal. 
Nonetheless, the Nation’s Executive Director of Business 
terminated Mr. Brown in May 2004, in large part because of Mr. 
Brown’s public statements. The trial court subsequently overturned 
the termination due to a clear violation of Mr. Brown’s freedom of 
speech. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial level 
judgment, beginning with the sentiment expressed below: 
Assuming arguendo that the free speech claim was a part of 
the complaint, it is a case of first impression. The Ho-
Chunk Nation Court system is not required to fully adopt 
the precedents established by the United States Supreme 
Court as to the United States Constitution. Rather, the Ho-
Chunk Nation Court system must rely on the Nation’s laws 
and perhaps, the Nation’s common law or tribal law.54 
Then, despite neither party raising the matter at trial,55 the 
Supreme Court pronounced it would “view the conduct of Mr. 
Brown as violative of the concept Wogixate, which is a value that could 
be defined as respect.”56 The Supreme Court had never employed 
this traditional concept before, and its amorphous quality enabled 
wide-ranging effect.57 In this case, woįgixate yielded the following 
consequence: 
According to tradition, it is not the Ho-Chunk way for an 
individual who is part of this community to independently 
take action without being respectful to the Tribe and its 
53. On this point, Mr. Brown misperceived the Nation’s employment policies
relating to Indian and Ho-Chunk preference, regarding such practices as racially 
discriminatory as opposed to the legitimate aims of a sovereign tribal government. 
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974); see also 6 HCC § 5.5b 
(codifying Indian preference provisions). 
54. Brown, SU 06-03 at 3.
55. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court refrained from addressing an issue
on appeal that the trial judge had no opportunity to consider below. Mudd v. HCN 
Legislature, SU 03-02 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 8, 2003) at 5 n.1; see also Campbell v. Davol, 
Inc., 620 F.3d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 2010) (“It is old and well-settled law that issues not 
raised in the trial court cannot be considered by this court as a basis for reversal.” 
(quotation and citation omitted)). 
56. Brown, SU 06-03 at 5.
57. Cf. supra text accompanying note 40 (referring to a case in which the court
analogized woįgixate with compassion to hold that an employer did not take 
sufficient steps to accommodate a disabled employee before terminating the 
employee). 
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leaders. For an individual to conduct themselves in such a 
manner in the past would have resulted in banishment. 
Here, for his conduct as demonstrated by the record, Mr. 
Brown suffered the loss of his employment, which is a 
significant punishment.58 
More specifically, “[t]he action of Mr. Brown in contacting the 
media constitute[d] an action motivated for his individual desires 
. . . . There is no need to determine whether the words and conduct 
of Dan Brown were protected, when his conduct ran so counter to 
those standards accepted by this tribal community.”59 
The Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court, therefore, avoided 
determining the degree of protection afforded by the constitutional 
Free Speech Clause.60 The Court’s willingness to equate a sincere, 
albeit misguided, criticism of a tribal employment practice with a 
significant affront to the tribal community allowed it to characterize 
the case in a different manner. The Supreme Court also drew a 
direct parallel between the traditional leadership and popularly 
elected executive and legislative representatives without any 
surrounding discussion. Ultimately, a distinct prospect exists that 
one’s freedom of speech must succumb to the expressed will of tribal 
government, which proves highly problematic.61 
In contrast, the second highlighted case involves a court actually 
considering the legitimacy of banishment or, at least, its 
contemporary equivalent—exclusion. In 2008, the Mille Lacs Band 
of Ojibwe promulgated an exclusion ordinance in response to 
increased criminality and violence on the reservation, especially as 
perpetrated by several emerging gangs.62 Darrick D. Williams Jr. was 
the sixth individual against whom the Band had filed an exclusion 
petition. The matter proceeded to the Mille Lacs Band Court of 
58. Brown, SU 06-03 at 5–6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. “The Ho-Chunk Nation, in exercising its powers of self-government, shall
not: (1) make or enforce any law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” HCN 
CONST. art. X, § 1(a)(1). 
61. Tellingly, Daniel M. Brown won elected tribal legislative office less than
four months after issuance of the appellate judgment. Ho-Chunk Nation Election 
Results, HOCĄK WORAK, June 13, 2007, at 1. Thereafter, the Ho-Chunk Nation 
Legislature voted overwhelmingly to designate Mr. Brown as tribal Vice President. 
Legislature, HOCĄK WORAK, Aug. 22, 2007, at 13 (quoting HCN LEG. MINS. (July 5, 
2007)). 
62. See Band Governmental Power and Sovereignty, 2 MLBSA §§ 3001–3013.
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Appeals on an interlocutory appeal, meaning that the trial court had 
not issued final findings of fact.63 
As a result, similar to Brown, the court of appeals avoided 
addressing the central issue. Instead, after acknowledging that it 
“ha[d] never addressed the issue of when a party may mount a facial 
challenge to a Band ordinance,”64 the court of appeals found that 
the exclusion ordinance could implicate fundamental rights.65 For 
instance, the court noted that Mr. Williams “expressed a desire to 
learn and practice the cultural and spiritual ways of the Anishinabe” 
at oral argument,66 thereby effectively raising a free exercise claim 
and justifying a facial attack.67 
After the court established these predicates, it proceeded to 
closely scrutinize the exclusion ordinance before rendering it 
ineffectual. The opinion examines federal case law addressing the 
identified subject areas and then superimposes this law onto Band 
statute.68 Yet, the governing statutory law actually obliges the 
presiding justices to interpret an ordinance by “consider[ing] and 
weigh[ing] unwritten cultural law, historical tribal legal opinions, 
and precedents of the Court of Central Jurisdiction.”69 
Unfortunately, the court of appeals seemingly bypassed this 
instruction and permitted a single individual to facially attack a law 
that tried to resurrect a customary practice of the tribe.70 
63. Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians v. Williams, 11-APP-06, 1–2 (MLB App.
Ct., Jan. 18, 2012). See generally Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973). 
64. Williams, 11-APP-06 at 2.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 3.
67. “The Band Assembly for the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians in exercising the powers of self-government shall make no law which 
prohibits the free exercise of religion . . . .” 1 MLBSA § 1(a) (2010). Both Brown and 
Williams raise constitutional concerns that should prompt an analysis of federal First 
Amendment jurisprudence, but each also raises questions about the application of 
tradition and custom. In Brown, the appellee could not elevate the exercise of his 
individual freedom over the common welfare of the tribe. Conversely, in Williams, 
the appellant not only could assert his individual rights, but also the rights of 
similarly situated individuals, at potential risk to the tribe. The cases demonstrate 
the inevitable tension that tribal judges and justices must try to alleviate. 
68. See Williams, 11-APP-06 at 8.
69. 24 MLBSA § 2008 (2012).
70. Had the court of appeals rejected the facial challenge, it would have likely
remanded the matter to the district court for purposes of deducing facts in 
connection with a surviving as-applied challenge. Currently, Darrick D. Williams Jr. 
is incarcerated at the Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Mr. 
17
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Neither of the above-discussed cases presented an easy legal or 
factual scenario. Accordingly, each warranted thoughtful and 
deliberate consideration, which likely occurred, but other influences 
may have prevented a more comprehensive examination. Tribal law 
often demands more than a primary, secondary, or even tertiary 
analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, tribal litigants will often assert various claims and 
defenses with lengthy and complicated pedigrees. A tribal judiciary 
must consequently endeavor to parse the ever-evolving 
jurisprudence—federal, state, and tribal—to discern fundamental 
concepts, doctrines, and principles. Each court must then correctly 
apply these standards and tenets within appropriate contexts lest it 
struggle with an inconsistent and tortured case history. Finally, 
tradition and custom can inform and transform each foreign 
concept if revealed by a court or the parties,71 and if it proves 
relevant to the matter at issue. 
Williams pled guilty on May 8, 2012, to RICO conspiracy. He received a sentence of 
nine years, eight months, and his projected release date is July 9, 2020. United States 
v. Williams, 12-CR-026, at 1–2 (D. Minn. May 30, 2013) (sentencing judgment); see
Andy Mannix, Native Mob Gang Members Plead to Lesser Charges in Federal Case, CITY 
PAGES (May 31, 2012), http://www.citypages.com/news/native-mob-gang-members 
-plead-to-lesser-charges-in-federal-case-6541926. 
71. On the one hand, a tribal court must endeavor to enunciate and proliferate
tribal tradition and custom. Supra note 3; see also HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 4-1(C) 
(2015) (“A judge or justice may . . . obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on 
federal law, tribal law, custom or tradition or on other sources of law applicable to 
a proceeding . . . .”); MLB JUD. CANONS, § 3(B)(7)(b) (2013), http://millelacsband 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Judicial-Canons-Court-Order-51.pdf (“A 
judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on federal law, state law, other 
sources of law, or tribal law, custom or tradition if the advice is applicable to a 
proceeding . . . .”). On the other hand, although a judge or justice must apply 
tradition and custom when appropriate, he or she must also remain an objective, 
neutral arbiter who cannot unduly advocate for any party. HCN JUD. R. ETHICS, § 4-
1(D) (2015) (“A tribal court judge or justice should not assume an advocate role.”); 
MLB JUD. CANONS, § 3(B)(5) (2013) (“A judge shall perform judicial duties without 
bias or prejudice.”). 
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